Boise State University

ScholarWorks
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty
Publications and Presentations

Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering

12-1-2008

Ballot Mark Detection
Elisa H. Barney Smith
Boise State University

Daniel Lopresti
Lehigh University

George Nagy
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

This document was originally published by IEEE in International Conference on Pattern Recognition. Copyright restrictions may apply. DOI: 10.1109/
ICPR.2008.4761549

Ballot Mark Detection
Elisa H. Barney Smith1, Daniel Lopresti2, George Nagy3
1
Boise State University, 2Lehigh University, 3Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
EBarneySmith@boisestate.edu, lopresti@cse.lehigh.edu, nagy@ecse.rpi.edu

Abstract
Optical mark sensing, i.e., detecting whether a
“bubble” has been filled in, may seem straightforward.
However, on US election ballots the shape, intensity,
size and position of the marks, while specified, are
highly variable due to a diverse electorate. The ballots
may be produced and scanned by poorly maintained
equipment. Yet near-perfect results are required. To
improve the current technology, which has been
subject to criticism, components of a process for
identifying marks on an optical sense ballot are
evaluated. When marked synthetic ballots are
compared to an unmarked ballot, the absolute
difference of adaptive thresholded images gives best
detection rates for all darknesses of marks, but at a
false alarm rate increase. Simple absolute differencing
can give good detection results with lower false alarm
rates.

1. Introduction
In the wake of disputed US elections in 2000,
Congress provided funds for new election machinery
through the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Because
of growing dissatisfaction with touch-screen displays,
many election districts are now leaning towards optical
mark sensing equipment for processing paper ballots.
A ballot consists of a set of contests. A contest may
select a single candidate for an office from among
several candidates (for instance, for State Senator, or
City Comptroller), several candidates (e.g., 6 City
Council Members from 15 candidates), or offer a
binary choice (retention/dismissal of a judge or
adoption/rejection of a statutory proposition).
A ballot comprises identification (election district,
date of election, ballot style number, page number),
instructions (to select a candidate, correct mistakes,
and cast the vote), a list of contests and alternatives

(candidates’ names and party affiliation for political
offices, propositions), and a set of targets to be
marked for each vote. Each voter places a mark in the
appropriate targets. Then the voter either runs the
ballot through a scanner (sometimes called a Portable
Ballot Counter or PBC), or puts it in an envelope for
processing at election headquarters after voting
closes.
The instructions on the ballot usually specify what
constitutes a valid mark (e.g., “darken the oval
completely with a #2 pencil or black pen”). In
contrast to the “bubble” answer sheets used for
standardized exams, what determines the legal
validity of the interpretation of a particular ballot is
the voter’s intent. In many states, election officials
affiliated with the competing parties work in teams to
asses mark validity.
We evaluate the capability of different algorithms
to distinguish marks from registration noise and
explore the accuracy and consistency of automated
image processing under various scenarios. The
metrics we investigate are the percentage of detected
spurious marks (false positives) and of missed marks
(false negatives) as a function of the size and contrast
of the marks and of the effect of marks overlaying
text or graphics.
We experiment with synthetic ballots because we
will eventually need an extreme range of mark
variation to address problems at the tail of the curve.
We report results on synthetic optical sense ballots
produced by placing marks with controlled variations
on images of real blank ballots (which also avoids
tedious manual mark characterization). We hope that
our results from these and future experiments will
help improve (1) ballot design, (2) optical mark sense
hardware and software, and, ultimately, (3) definition
of what constitutes an intentional mark. Although
optical mark sense technology debuted 80 years ago,
we are not aware of any comparable published
research.
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2. Ballot and Mark Data
We experimented with a base ballot template from
Minnesota (Fig. 1) that is generally representative of
the filled-oval format of ballots. Although the
instructions for this ballot specify that the voter should
fill in the oval targets, some voters may well use a
check mark or an X. Voters may also drag their pencil
and leave stray strokes or hesitation marks (small dark
dots). Our approach is designed to detect of all of these
mark types. Later analysis can be designed to
distinguish between mark types.
Synthetically marked ballots were created using the
methods described in [3]. Four marked ballots were
evaluated for these tests, with 58 marks each, most
intended to be “difficult.” Marks were entered with a
variety of shapes (oval, dot, check and X), five gray
intensity levels, five sizes and a variety of positions
relative to the target ovals (Fig. 2). Most marks are
centered in the target oval, but 37% are displaced far
enough to overlap the candidate or party text, or the
ballot rulings. While in a real election there should be
only one vote for each office, we deliberately applied
marks to all the targets in order to reduce image file
handling. We have placed these ballots online [4].

Figure 1. A blank sample ballot

3. Mark Processing Methods
Mark detection requires more than determining
whether the content of a target position exceeds a
threshold. The presence of possibly valid marks
outside the nominal positions brings ballot image
processing from optical mark sensing to a variation on
forms reading.
In traditional forms-processing, the material of
interest will be (predominantly) found in specific
fields. Accuracy is improved by the use of context
from a database: pre-recorded names, addresses and
part numbers. Processing then involves recognizing
and registering the form, and extracting the new text
using context. In contrast, the voter is anonymous, and
we cannot even use priors like “most voters in Idaho
vote Republican.” As in forms, a ballot enrollment
stage identifies the locations of the target ovals. Ideally
the marks will consist of large solid black marks and
only the presence or lack of sufficient fill within the
oval would need to be detected. In reality even marks
that do not follow the ballot instructions must be
located and identified because the legal definition of a
vote is voter intent. In some jurisdictions, any of the
marks shown in Figure 2 that appear somewhere
within a target would be considered valid votes, while
marks that appear completely outside the target area
are important to detect so that the ballot can be flagged
for followup examination.

Figure 2. Part of a synthetically filled ballot
with examples of four mark types, four
alternate sizes and four alternate gray levels.
If ballots were printed with drop-out ink, then only
user-added marks would be recorded when the page
was imaged with the appropriate light. Since most
election districts are not willing to accept this
additional cost, the form background must be
removed through image registration and image
differencing. The blank template ballot image is
aligned with the marked ballot image using a
frequency based correlation filter [5]. The image
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difference is calculated to reveal the added material in
a manner similar to forms processing [8, 10].
Five different image differencing algorithms are
evaluated while looking for additions to the blank
ballot. Even with perfect image registration, the noise
from variations in printing and scanning will introduce
differences. We report how each of these differencing
techniques performs in the context of identifying
marks of unknown shapes in arbitrary positions.
The five differencing techniques are as follows:
D1. The absolute value of the difference between the
raw images.
D2. The absolute value of the difference between the
raw images, smoothed by a 3x3 uniform kernel.
D3. The absolute value of the difference between 3x3
smoothed images.
D4. The absolute value of the difference between 3x3
smoothed images, smoothed by a 3x3 uniform
kernel.
D5. The absolute difference of smoothed adaptively
binarized images.
A median filter was applied in all cases to reduce
the effects of spatial sampling phase and additive
noise. After thresholding the difference image,
connected components were identified. Components
smaller than 2x2 pixels were removed.
Morphological closing with a disk of radius 10 was
then applied This was intended to merge components
that were broken because the marks crossed text or
rulings. It also mended some of the X and check marks
that had split because the smoothing had lowered the
intensity of part of the mark stroke below the
threshold.

Experimental Results
The filtered difference images were thresholded at
threshold levels ranging from 96 to 240 (on a 0 to 255
scale) in steps of 8. A lower threshold retains more of
the difference and therefore fewer marks are missed. A
higher threshold increases the false alarm rate. With
thresholds up to 152, all black mark additions were
retained with every differencing method. Differencing
method D2 was the most sensitive to the choice of
threshold level. The checks and X’s were more
sensitive to the threshold than the filled ovals and dots

D1
D2
D3
D4
D5

in methods D2 and D4, and less in methods D3 and
D5. On bilevel ballot images, method D1 was not
sensitive to threshold.
Table 1 shows the base results with a threshold of
120 over all ballot samples including a range of mark
shapes, contrasts and sizes. Very few false alarms
(#FA) were detected in methods D1-D4. In method
D5 the morphological closing increased the size of
many of the adaptive threshold ghosts beyond the
2x2 cutoff, so more of them were detected. Several of
the false alarms related to the same ballot image
defects were spatially clustered. Some of the missed
check marks occurred because some neighboring
check marks, as shown in Fig. 2, were merged during
the closing and counted as only a single detection.
Since not all marks will be made with black pen or
medium soft pencil, the data set included marks with
a range of different gray levels: {0, 36, 80, 132, 190},
where 0 is black, and 255 is white. Differencing
method D5 had the best detection accuracy for all
mark intensities due to its use of adaptive
thresholding. Adaptive binarization allows the
differencing threshold to be decreased without
missing more marks. A differencing threshold of 144
yielded 100% detection with no false alarms. The
effect of gray level on the detectability depended on
the mark shape. At low thresholds, 100% of the ovals
can be detected with every differencing method. The
errors in the gray=0 case are due to the merged marks
reported earlier.
The other variable in the marks in our dataset was
the size of the mark. The marks had a base size, and a
subset of the marks in the data set were produced in
sizes 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% of that base size.
The size of the mark had no effect on the
detectability on this data set.

Conclusion
In our experiments the color or darkness of the
mark was the biggest factor in the detectability of the
marks. Marks were best detected when adaptive
thresholding was used, but this lead to a significantly
higher false alarm rate, and requires more processing
time. The size and shape of the mark did not affect
the detection performance. The choice of threshold is

Table 1: Detection rates by mark shape over entire data set of 232 marks .
# FA
% Detected
% Detected % detected % Detected % Detected
Total
X
Check
Oval
Dot
3
97.4
97.0
95.8
100.0
98.1
4
95.7
94.0
94.4
100.0
96.2
7
96.6
97.0
94.4
100.0
96.2
5
94.4
97.0
88.7
97.6
96.2
31
99.1
100.0
97.2
100.0
100.0
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D1
D2
D3
D4
D5

Table 2: Detection rates given mark gray level intensity.
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Gray =0
Gray =36
Gray =80
Gray =132
Gray =191
99.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
63.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
66.7
45.4
99.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
45.4
99.5
100.0
100.0
58.3
45.4
99.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

important, as is the size of the structuring element for
morphological closing. A smaller structuring element
would not merge adjacent marks, but more detected
marks would be broken. Only a few false alarms
occurred. Identifying marks for which additional logic
is necessary was one of the goals of these pilot
experiments.
Only translation between the template ballot and the
test ballot was accommodated in our experiments.
Skew or scale distortion, such as often found in
scanned ballots (with skew being more likely than
scale), can be estimated and corrected with the FourierMellon transformation [2, 6].
With a wider range of ballot images, the false alarm
rate will increase. Here only differences were
identified. To distinguish marks from noise the
identification of the detected components could be
supplemented by exploiting the expected consistency
of marks on each ballot. We could compare each
detected mark candidate to the average or median of all
the marks on the same ballot. If most of the marks are
large checkmarks, then it would be reasonable to
classify a small X as a hesitation mark. On the other
hand, if the majority of the marks consist of a small X,
then a large oval might be an extraneous blob or
erasure. The mathematical framework for this kind of
analysis, dubbed style, appears in [7, 9].
The above characterization, applied to real ballots,
may be sufficient not only to establish an algorithm for
detecting the marks, but also to determine the validity
of a ballot and the resulting tally. What types of marks
are acceptable, and how much variation among
individual marks on a single ballot can be tolerated,
must of course be left to election officials. We can,
however, simulate various scenarios, and compare the
results on synthetic ballots (prepared to mimic the
distribution of marks expect in actual elections) with
those obtained by submitting the same ballots to
commercial optical-sense ballot counting devices.
The development of an ultra-reliable and
trustworthy paper-based voting technology would have
broad impact. Such technologies tend to win
acceptance slowly. Right now, however, we are at a
cross-roads, with several radically different voting
technologies competing for acceptance. It is therefore
timely to direct attention toward the role that paper

records can play. We hope our work will inspire the
research community to take a closer look at some of
the interesting technical problems that arise.
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